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Abstract
We analyze the implications of linking the compensation of fund managers to the return of
their portfolio relative to that of a benchmark. In the presence of such relative-performance-
based objectives, investors have reduced expected utility but markets are typically more infor-
mative and deeper. Furthermore, in a multiple asset/market framework we show that () relative
performance concerns lead to an increase in the correlation between markets (financial conta-
gion); () benchmark inclusion leads to increases in price volatility; () home bias emerges as
a rational outcome. Finally, when information is costly, information acquisition is hindered and
this attenuates the eﬀects on informativeness and depth of the market.
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I Introduction
An interesting omission in standard portfolio choice theory is that professional portfolio managers
such as mutual, pension, and hedge fund managers are ignored and investors are assumed to manage
their own portfolios. This assumption depicted the equity market in the mid-1950s well, yet direct
holdings of corporate equity by the household sector has fallen from 99 percent in 1945 to 47 percent
in 2010.1
Recently, two related strands of literature have aimed to answer some of the questions raised
by the issue of delegated portfolio management and the associated agency problems in modern
markets. The first of these strands concentrates on the determination of optimal contracts to solve
the agency problem between the portfolio manager and the investor. The optimal contract is often
depicted as one that rewards performance relative to a benchmark. The other strand investigates
whether relative performance might lead a manager to change fund’s risk exposure and if this
behavior is linked to the manager’s compensation package.
In this paper, we seek to expand the insights oﬀered in the literature along the second strand.
Our focus is not on optimal contracts. Instead, we take the optimal contract as given, carrying
the properties commonly observed in practice.2 Then, we analyze the eﬀects of the adoption
of relative performance pay for fund managers. Diﬀerently from the previous literature, we move
away from the questions about risk exposure, exploring other interesting implications for the market
microstructure. First, we show that if fund managers are rewarded based on a relative performance
measure, there can be deleterious eﬀects for investors. More precisely, investors will have a lower
expected utility. However, markets will typically be more informative and deeper, provided that
information is free. We also observe an increase in the correlation between markets. That is, we
1Based on Flow of Funds data from the Federal Reserve Board (Table B.100.e). Note that these figures actually
understate the "influence" of financial intermediaries on the individual portfolio decisions since, according to Invest-
ment Company Institute, 67 percent of individual investors seek services of financial advisors when making their
decisions.
2Note that the form of relative performance objectives can be flexible. These objectives do not have to be spelled
out in formal contracts but may emerge as a result of competitive forces and/or behavioral factors (e.g., keeping up
with the Joneses). We do use the words "objective", "contract", and "concern" almost interchangably throughout.
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show that the higher the importance of relative performance, the higher the correlation between
two separate markets. And, we show that a stock that is included in the benchmark experiences an
increase in its price volatility. Finally, information acquisition may be hindered by these types of
contracts. This last eﬀect may, ex-ante, reduce the informativeness and depth of the market. So,
even though conditional on information being acquired markets function better, less information
acquisition may emerge and act in a countervailing way.
Investors usually base their investment decisions on fund performance typically choosing funds
that have high returns compared to similar funds (see, among others, Chevalier and Ellison (1997)
and Sirri and Tufano (1998)). This behavior, combined with the usual fee structure in a fund
(charged as a percentage of funds), leads to relative performance objectives for fund managers: you
are only doing well in as much as you are doing better than your competitor. So, our assumption
of relative performance contracts is mostly a modeling short-cut to be interpreted as a reduced
form of this more elaborate situation. Palomino (2005) shows that if investors use a relative
performance rule to evaluate funds and allocate money into them, and managers receive an asset-
based compensation, then this translates into relative performance objectives for fund managers.
In the model, there are two investment funds in a market for an asset. Each fund manager
observes a signal concerning the profitability of the risky asset. Markets function like in Kyle
(1985), with the diﬀerence that we have two insiders, signals are noisy and, more importantly, each
manager’s payoﬀ depends on his performance, as well as on the performance of the other manager.
Fund owners reward the managers, the fund investors, and keep the rest to themselves. We analyze
standard measures of market eﬃciency, and how the fund investors are aﬀected by the presence
of this relative performance objective function. We also analyze the managers’ own well-being by
accepting such contracts.
We extend the model to allow for two separate markets for two assets, and show that the
correlation across markets is increasing in the measure of relative performance. In other words,
contagion eﬀects may appear, or be exacerbated by the presence of such contracts. In a similar
vein, with two assets but both traded in the same market, we show that inclusion of a stock in the
benchmark leads its price to experience higher price volatility. And, in another extension, we show
3
how relative performance contracts may lead to a form of home bias.
Finally, we allow the choice to be informed to be endogenous, with costly signals. Specifically, we
allow for two diﬀerent information structures: public or private costly information. Under the first
structure, either all fund managers pay the cost of acquiring information and all become informed
or none of them do so. Under the second structure, each manager may decide independently.
We show that, probabilistically, an increase in the importance of relative performance reduces
the availability of informed equilibrium. That is, the more the managers’ pay depend on relative
performance, the lower the probability that either one decides to acquire information. Therefore,
even though conditional on having informed agents the informativeness of prices is increasing on the
importance of relative performance, we see that ex-ante this eﬀect may be attenuated or cancelled
by the fact that the chance of having an informed equilibrium is reduced. This countervailing eﬀect
is also present when analyzing the expected price response to trades (a measure inversely related
to market depth).
Our paper relates and contributes to the literature in several ways. Some papers study the
optimal portfolio strategy of a manager receiving fees that depend on relative performance (see,
among others, Grinblatt and Titman (1989), Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996), Chen and Pen-
nacchi (1999), Eichberger, Grant, and King (1999), and Goriaev, Palomino, and Prat (2000)). The
general focus in these studies is on the eﬀects on portfolio riskiness with results showing that man-
agers tend to over-bear risk in order to beat the benchmark, especially when they are behind in
the game. Our model delivers a similar result, although not central to our paper and in a slightly
diﬀerent manner. Since we adopt a Kyle-type framework, what we show is that managers trade
more aggressively, i.e., put more weight on their signal, as the importance of relative performance
increases. Since, for a given signal, managers increase their trading activity, this can be loosely in-
terpreted as an increase in risk-taking behavior. The literature has also provided empirical evidence
of this type of behavior, hence we take this as an already tested implication of our model.3
As mentioned earlier, Palomino (2005) develops a model that indirectly generates the same
type of objectives for managers and shows that, with entry and exit by funds (with exogenously
3See Goriaev, Palomino, and Prat (2000) and references therein.
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given diﬀerential ability), these objectives may lead to survival of better-quality funds and, hence,
higher expected returns for investors. We diﬀer in our approach by assuming a fixed market
structure (no entry), homogenous ability of funds with endogenous informational asymmetries and
by analyzing the eﬀects of varying the level of relative vis-à-vis absolute compensation on investors
as well as on other market variables. Our results on investors’ returns are in clear contrast to his.
Since the modeling approaches are diﬀerent, this, in and of itself, does not mean any immediate
conflict. But it does point to the need of understanding the diﬀerent forces at play: diﬀerential
ability and information acquisition. In his paper, better-quality funds have a competitive advantage
in acquiring information, and hence in equilibrium the market is populated by more informed
individuals providing services to investors. In our setting, no fund has an edge and hence there is
no inclination to have a more informative market. So, more concern about relative performance here
leads to aggressive trading strategies and lower expected returns for investors, while in Palomino
(2005) it leads to more high-quality funds entering the market (with better info) and hence investors
having higher returns. However, in contradiction with empirical evidence on market eﬃciency
(e.g., Berk and Green (2004)), Palomino’s work seems to lead to a mutual fund industry that can
outperform the market (passive strategy), while our model does not suﬀer from such a counter-
intuitive implication.4 Finally, we also discuss home bias, contagion and addition to benchmarks,
topics not discussed in Palomino (2005).
In another related paper, Cuoco and Kaniel (2011) examine the eﬀects of delegated portfolio
management on equilibrium asset prices assuming a contract for fund managers that is a generaliza-
tion of the one postulated here. The main diﬀerences between the model here and their work rest on
the assumed market structure and objectives. They analyze a problem under perfect competition
concentrating on the potential for price eﬀects on the stocks that are included in the benchmark.5
They show that stocks that are included in the benchmark tend to have higher and more volatile
prices than otherwise identical stocks. The analysis in this paper is under imperfect competition
and, while replicating this volatility eﬀect, aims at examining the eﬀects of such contracts on the
market microstructure, in terms of liquidity, price informativeness, cross-market correlation and in-
4Results on price informativeness and trading aggressiveness are similar across both papers.
5Brennan (1993) also considers the eﬀects of such contracts on equilibrium expected returns and prices.
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formation acquisition. To the best of our knowledge, the results describing these eﬀects are specific
to this paper and have not been analyzed in the same setting elsewhere.
Finally, a diﬀerent strand of the literature focuses on optimal contracts that solve/mitigate the
agency problem inherit in delegated portfolio management.6 As mentioned above, in this paper we
do not tackle this problem. Instead, we take the contract as given and analyze its eﬀects.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the basics of the model.
In Section III, we analyze the eﬀects of the presence of a relative performance-type contract for
fund managers in a market where they have free access to information and derive the main results.
In Section IV, we study the eﬀects of relative performance on the decision to acquire information
and discuss the diﬀerences that emerge from endogeneizing the information acquisition decision.
Section V concludes.
II The Basic Model
Throughout most of the paper, we assume that there are two mutual funds in a market for an
asset.7 Each fund manager observes a signal concerning the profitability of the risky asset.8 Markets
function like in Kyle (1985), with the diﬀerence that we have two insiders/managers and signals
are noisy. More precisely, assume that the risky asset final payoﬀ is given by
e ∼  ¡0 2¢  (1)
Each manager observes a noisy signal about the final payoﬀ
e = e + e  = 1 2 (2)
with  ⊥ , and where the noise terms are jointly normal with  (e) = 2. Furthermore, we
assume that the necessary noise in the market comes from liquidity trades given by e ∼  ¡0 2¢.
6This agency problem has been discussed in a number of papers, e.g., Starks (1987), Heinkel and Stoughton
(1994), Admati and Pfleiderer (1997), Das and Sundaram (1998a,b), Ou-Yang (2003), and Dybvig, Farnsworth, and
Carpenter (2010).
7This is without loss of generality. We could allow for more funds and results would be qualitatively the same.
8This signal may or may not be costly. We analyze both cases.
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Each manager’s payoﬀ depends directly on his performance relative to a benchmark. We pos-
tulate the following form for manager ’s objective:
max E { [ ( −  )−  ( −  )] |}  (3)
where  is price of the asset,  denotes the portfolio weights,  is just a scaling factor, and 
represents how much his payoﬀ depends on relative performance.9 Fund managers’ concern with
relative performance such as this may arise if the fund uses a “fulcrum fee” or if they are rewarded
based on the size of their fund and consumers invest more in funds that perform better.10
Fund owners pay managers as well as the investors. We assume that a proportion  of this fund
profits goes to investors.11 Therefore, the total expected cost for the owners of fund  is
E [∗ ( −  )] + E
£¡∗ − ∗¢ ( −  )¤ = ( +  (1− ))E [∗ ( −  )]  (4)
where ∗ represents the solution to manager ’s problem. The equality follows from the fact that
we concentrate on a symmetric equilibrium and that the signals are i.i.d. Given this structure of
contracts, a natural assumption is that  +  (1− )  1, to guarantee that owners are making
positive expected profits:
E [∗ ( −  )]− ( +  (1− ))E [∗ ( −  )]  0 (5)
Finally, we assume that investors are risk-neutral and would like to maximize expected profits:
E [ ( − )].
Prices are determined by a risk-neutral competitive market maker that only observes aggregate
market orders. As usual, the market maker is held down to a zero profit condition that translates
into semi-strong eﬃciency of the market:
 = E [|1 + 2 + ]  (6)
9This payoﬀ function is a special case of the more general one assumed in Cuoco and Kaniel (2011).
10See, for instance, Palomino (2005).
11Since we have a static model, the fund payoﬀ will also be the amount of money in the fund after the realization
of the random variables. Hence, paying  to investors is the same as charging a percentage fee on the amount of
funds, i.e., the fee is 1− , a common practice.
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III Free Information
In this section, we assume that the fund managers are endowed with rights to the information
provided by the signals. Basically, they have free access to the signal, . We divide the section into
two subsections. In the first, we restrict attention to one market and present the results concerning
investor’s utility and market parameters’ behavior as a function of the relative performance contract.
In the second subsection, we allow for the existence of two separate markets and analyze the issue
of cross-market contagion.
III.1 Single market
With this basic set-up at hand, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1 A symmetric linear equilibrium of the market described is given by
 =  (1 + 2 + )   = e (7)
with
 =
s
2
2 (1− )2 + 22 and  =
22
q 2
2(1−)2+22
(22 + 2) 2(1−)2+2 + 2
 (8)
Proof. See Appendix.
We can now calculate the ex-ante expected profit of fund ’s investors, as a function of .
Corollary 1 Ex-ante, investors expect to receive
E [ ()] = E [ ( −  )] = 2
r2
2
Ã p2 + (1− )2
2 (2 + 2) + (1− )2
!
(9)
from their investments into fund  ∈ {1 2}.
And, we can easily prove the following results.
Corollary 2 Investors are worse oﬀ the higher the relative performance pay component is.
Proof. See Appendix.
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Furthermore, in the terminology of Kyle (1985), we know that the depth of the market can be
represented as 1 , and that price informativeness is a decreasing function of   [| ]. Then, as
another corollary to Proposition 1, we have:
Corollary 3 If the importance of relative performance on fund managers pay is increased:
() Liquidity om the markets increases;
() The information content of prices increases;
() Adverse selection costs faced by noise (liquidity) traders decrease;
() Trading aggressiveness of fund managers increases.
Proof. See Appendix.
To summarize, the adoption of relative performance contracts has positive and negative eﬀects.
Investors are worse oﬀ12 but markets function better, under free information acquisition. In the
next section we show that some of these, apparent, positive eﬀects of relative performance may
disappear once we endogeneize the decision to become informed. But, before we move on, we
present the results for multiple assets/markets, analyzing the possibility of cross-market contagion
and volatility eﬀects.
III.2 Multiple Markets
Here we extend the model to allow for multiple assets and markets. First, we analyze the eﬀects
of fulcrum fees on cross-market correlations. Then we look at the eﬀect of including a stock in the
benchmark.
III.2.1 Cross-Market Correlation
Suppose there are two separate markets for two distinct assets. Each market maintains the structure
discussed in Section II, and they are separated by the assumption that each pair of funds trades in
only one of them. Each fund is benchmarked only against the other fund that trades in the same
12We show later that fund managers are worse oﬀ as well.
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market, and each market has a potentially diﬀerent .13 We assume, without loss of generality,
that funds 1 and 2 trade on asset/market 1, and that funds 3 and 4 trade on asset/market 2. We
let  be the relative performance parameter for each market  = 1 2. Furthermore, each market
maker observes only the aggregate order flow of his own market. This is an important assumption
because we assume that the assets’ payoﬀs are correlated, therefore order flow in one market oﬀers
information about the payoﬀ of the asset traded in the other market. So, there are two risky assets
with final payoﬀs given by
e ∼  ¡0 2¢ (10)
and signals given by
e = e + e  = 11 21 32 42 (11)
where  index markets/assets and  index managers, with the understanding that managers 1 and
2 trade in the market for asset 1, and managers 3 and 4 trade on asset 2. We also assume that
signals have the same precision, so that   (e) = 2, and liquidity trades are given by e ∼
 ¡0 2¢. Finally, we assume that all random variables are normally distributed and independent
of each other, with the exception of e1 and e2, where we assume that  (e1 e2) = 12  0.
Given this structure, it is clear that the issue at hand is not one of contagion per se. We do not
investigate the question of appearance of correlation across assets that are otherwise uncorrelated.
The objective is to analyze the marginal eﬀect of relative performance contracts on cross-market
correlation. Even if  = 0, ∀, we would have correlated prices, because payoﬀs are correlated.
With the correlation recognized, we show how the presence of such contracts may enhance this
correlation.
13This assumption would be justified if the chosen benchmarks reflect the characteristics or "style" of a fund. This
is indeed the case in a theoretical setting (e.g., Ou-Yang (2003)), but it is also true, at least to a certain extent, in
practice as most funds use a market index (such as the S&P 500 or Russell) that is adjusted on size and value/growth
dimensions to the fund’s characteristics (Sensoy (2009)). Note that in an international setting the use of domestic
benchmarks, i.e., performance of those trading in the same market, would also be justified by the potentially higher
costs faced by investors if they choose a foreign fund over a domestic one, perhaps due to cross-border diﬀerences in
regulations and institutional and legal frameworks.
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Proposition 2 With the described set-up for each market we have that
 =  (1 + 2 + ) and  = e (12)
where
 =
s
2
2 (1− )2 + 22 and  =
22
q 2
2(1−)2+22
(22 + 2) 2(1−)2+2 + 2
(13)
characterizes a linear symmetric equilibrium in each market . Given this characterization, we
can calculate the correlation between 1 and 2 to be equal to
 = 412

12q¡
42121 + 22121 + 21
¢ ¡
42222 + 22222 + 22
¢  (14)
And,

  0 ∀ (15)
Proof. See Appendix.
This proposition shows that the presence of relative performance contracts may enhance corre-
lation between markets. We observe more correlated prices whenever at least one of the markets
has funds with relative performance contracts. This result does not depend on the assumption that
both markets have relative performance contracts. It is enough that one of the markets has this
type of contract. Then, if the importance of relative performance is increased in such a market, the
correlation across markets increase. The intuition for this result comes, again, from the fact that
aggressiveness increases with relative performance. An increase in the aggressiveness with which
traders use their signals leads prices to reflect these signals more prominently. Since the signals
are functions of the correlated final values, the importance of this correlation increases, leading to
more correlated prices.
III.2.2 Benchmark Inclusion
Next we consider a slightly modified version of the model. As before, there are two risky assets
with final payoﬀs given by (10) but with  (e1 e2) = 0. Furthermore, assume that we have two
funds, both trading on these assets, and let each manager have perfect signals about both assets,
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e ≡ 0. So, we have two independent assets that are traded by two funds. (Previously, we have
considered one asset traded by two funds, and then two assets each of which is traded by both
funds). This generalization naturally leads us to re-define manager ’s objective as
max12 E { [1 (1 − 1) + 2 (2 − 2)− 11 (1 − 1)− 22 (2 − 2)] |1 2}  (16)
Since we have independent assets, we can re-write this objective as
max1 E { [1 (1 − 1)− 11 (1 − 1)] |1}+max2 E { [2 (2 − 2)− 22 (2 − 2)] |2} 
(17)
The parameter  is meant to capture the importance of asset in the benchmark. An example
where diﬀerent  may arise is the case where one asset is listed in the S&P 500 and the other is
not. Or, alternatively, an asset may be domestic while the other may be foreign. With independent
liquidity trades, , we can solve the problem for each asset separately and obtain
 =  (1 + 2 + )   = 1 2 and  = e  = 1 2 (18)
with
 =
s
2
2 (1− )2 and  =
q
2(1−)22
(3− )  (19)
Hence,
  () = ()2
h
42 ()2 + 2
i
=
42
(3− )2
+
2 (1− )2
(3− )2
=
22
3−   (20)
We consider a stock  to be included in the benchmark iﬀ   0. Notice that, if  = 0, then
  () = 232  2
2
3− . Therefore, when a stock is not included in the benchmark,  = 0, it
has a smaller price volatility than when it is included. So, inclusion raises volatility. Furthermore,
the more heavily the compensation package relies on a stock (higher ), the higher the variance
of that stock price, i.e.,  ()  0. This result is similar to the one obtained by Cuoco and
Kaniel (2011), albeit in a diﬀerent market microstructure.
III.2.3 Home Bias with Exogenous Benchmark
Now, once again, we change the framework of our model slightly to explore yet another eﬀect of
relative performance: home bias. We assume that, instead of having two funds each indexed against
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the other, we have one fund indexed against a given exogenous benchmark (for instance, the S&P
500). So, we have two assets each with final value given by
e ∼  ¡0 2¢   = 1 2 (21)
and signals given by
e = e (22)
where  index assets and there is only one fund manager. We also assume that liquidity trades
are given by e ∼  ¡0 2¢ and are independent of each other and of the assets’ final value.
Finally, we assume that the fund manager’s expected payoﬀ is given by
E
© ( −  ) +  £( −  ) −  ( −  )¤ª 
where
 =
⎛
⎝ 1
2
⎞
⎠   =
⎛
⎝ 1
2
⎞
⎠   =
⎛
⎝ 1
2
⎞
⎠   =
⎛
⎝ 1
2
⎞
⎠
and  is the weight of asset  on the exogenous benchmark (for instance, the participation of the
stock on the S&P 500).
By solving the model in the same way as before, we have
 =  +
 =  ( + ) 
for  = 1 2 and
 = ( + )2   =

2
  = 22 + 2

And, if we concentrate in a situation similar to the ones discussed in the previous sections by
imposing  +  = 1, we have that
 =
Ãs
1
2
2
2
!
 + 
2

Ãs
1
2
2
2
!
 =  
where the last term is the traditional demand in this setting without relative performance pay
(see Kyle (1985)). Therefore, we see that, if funds are benchmarked against an exogenous index,
demand for asset  increases with .
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If we think about asset 1 as domestic and asset 2 as foreign and assume that domestic funds are
benchmarked against domestic assets only (2 = 0), we see that these funds will be overexposed
to domestic assets:   1 . This result provides an alternative explanation for the widely-
documented home bias phenomenon, i.e., the observation that investors tend to favor local stocks,
both in an international (e.g., Tesar and Werner (1995)) and domestic setting (e.g., Coval and
Moskowitz (1999)).14’15
IV Information Acquisition
Next, we revert back to the single asset framework, but assume that fund managers may or may
not acquire costly information. Let  denote the information acquisition cost. If no information
is acquired, the manager stays out of the market. This is because uninformed trading is non-
profitable. We start with a simple case where both managers have access to the information or
not - either both are informed or both are uninformed. Then we analyze the more interesting case
where each manager decides independently whether to acquire information or not.
IV.1 Information as a Public Good
If both managers either have access to the information or not, calculating manager ’s profit if both
decide to be informed is straightforward and leads to the following.
Proposition 3 Each manager expects to be paid
E [( − ) ( −  )] =  (1− )2
∙ 2 + (1− )2
2 (2 + 2) + (1− )2
¸

And,

 E [( − ) ( −  )]  0 (23)
14Another form of home bias has been documented in that employees tend to hold excessive amounts of own
company stock in their retirement saving plans (e.g., Benartzi and Thaler (2001)). Pinheiro (2008) provides a
rational explanation for this seemingly suboptimal exposure based on social interactions.
15Most explanations for home bias rely either on impediments to trade due to institutional, legal, and regulatory
frameworks or on some form of residence-based assymmetric information.
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Therefore, fund managers’ pay is decreasing on the relative performance parameter. Furthermore,
if there exists a  such that
E [( − ) ( −  )] =  (24)
then for any    no information is acquired.
Proof. See Appendix.
The above proposition shows that not only investors are worse oﬀ but also the managers them-
selves. More importantly, given the cost of signals, it may be the case that for high enough  no
information is acquired. While it may come as a surprise at a first glance, this is an intuitive result:
Profits are decreasing in , so if there is a point where the managers are just indiﬀerent between
acquiring information or not, then, for any higher  they will prefer to be uninformed and save .
In summary, conditional on the information being acquired, prices are more informative (as
described in Section III), but it may be the case that no information is acquired at all, rendering
the earlier point on the information content of prices moot.
To enhance our understanding of these countervailing eﬀects, we further assume that the cost
of information acquisition is randomly drawn from a distribution  (), common to both managers.
The cost is drawn once from this distribution and represents the cost for each manager. Based on
the analysis so far, we know that the managers will acquire information with probability
 (E [( − ) ( −  )])  (25)
i.e., if e  E [( − ) ( −  )].
We can then calculate the expected price response to trades, i.e., E ():
 (E [( − ) ( −  )])
22
q 2
2(1−)2+22
(22 + 2) 2(1−)2+2 + 2
+ [1−  (E [( − ) ( −  )])]× 0
(26)
Hence,

E () =  ()
∙ 
 (E [( − ) ( −  )])
¸
+
∙ 
 ()
¸
 (E [( − ) ( −  )])  0
(27)
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where the inequality follows from the fact that

 (E [( − ) ( −  )])  0 (28)
as argued before, and  ()  0, as proved in Corollary 3.
This result shows that the expected price response to order flow decreases as  increases. This
would indicate that markets are more liquid, even when there is an additional information acquisi-
tion stage. However, if we were to measure the depth of the market, the usual measure of liquidity
in this framework, we would run into problems. Depth is given by 1 , which is undefined (goes to
infinity) if there are no informed traders in the market. Hence, as long as there is a strictly positive
probability of no information collection, depth would be independent of . And, the market would
have an infinite expected depth. Therefore, we concentrate on the former measure to claim that
markets are more liquid with relative performance, even in the presence of information acquisition
stage. Notice that this result is independent of  ().
We can also measure the expected informational content of prices. This can be shown to be
inversely related to16
2
µ
1−  (E [( − ) ( −  )])
∙
422
422 + 222 + 2
¸¶
 (29)
And, diﬀerentiating the above expression with respect to  reveals
 [ (E [( − ) ( −  )])]

∙ −424
422 + 222 + 2
¸
−  (E [( − ) ( −  )])
∙ 2
422 + 222 + 2
¸2
82  (30)
16Note that this is no longer   (| ). This is just the expected value of the conditional variance of , conditional
on whether or not there was information acquisition. Since  now is a mixed random variable, no longer normal,
calculation of   (| ) would be very elaborate. And, we adopt this short-cut measure just to grasp the idea of the
countervailing eﬀects at play. The true value for it is obtained by adding to the expression in the text the following
term
 (E [( − ) ( −  )]) [1−  (E [( − ) ( −  )])] 2
2 [ ( 1 +  2 + )]
2 422 + 222 + 2 
making it even messier, and, now, dependent of the realization of random variables. Note that this term has zero
expected value. Therefore, the expression in the main text is just the expected value of the conditional variance.
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The first term is the product of two negative terms, hence positive. The last term is the product
of two terms with opposite signs, hence negative. The overall sign of the expression cannot be
determined. The first term represents the fact that there is less chance of obtaining more informative
prices and less information acquisition. The second term represents the eﬀect that, if information
is acquired, prices will be more informative. The overall eﬀect is indeterminate.
In order to determine the sign of this expression subject to certain circumstances, we further
simplify our model. The assumptions and results are spelled out in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Assume that the distribution of costs is uniform on [0 ], with
  
q
(1− )3
3− 
r22
2
 (31)
And, furthermore, set e ≡ 0. Then, the expected informational content of prices is decreasing in
, i.e., expression (30) is positive, so that the expected conditional variance of prices increases with
.
Proof. See Appendix.
This proposition shows that, with some additional restrictions, the result that price informa-
tiveness increases with  is reversed. The eﬀect of less information acquisition dominates the eﬀect
that, conditional on information acquisition, prices are more informative. So, higher  leads to less
informative prices ex-ante.
In summary, either with free information or costly public information, our model delivers that
markets are deeper, the more important the relative performance objective is (lower E ()). How-
ever, costly information, even public, may lead to less informative prices (e.g., under uniform
distribution of costs). The intuition for the first result is clear: The depth of the market is inversely
related to the information asymmetry problem, so less information acquisition cannot, in the cur-
rent framework, decrease depth. The second result is a direct consequence of the decrease in the
probability of information acquisition.
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IV.2 Information as a Private Good
We now move to a more interesting informational structure. Suppose that each manager may or
may not be informed. In other words, there are three possible outcomes: two informed managers,
one informed and one uninformed, and both uninformed. For this part of the analysis, we again
consider the case where agents have perfect information if they decide to be informed, i.e., we set
 ≡ 0.
First suppose that both managers are informed. Then each has an expected profit of
E [( − ) ( −  )] = 
q
(1− )3
3− 
r22
2
 (32)
If only one is informed, we are in the exact framework of Kyle (1985),  is irrelevant, and we know
that the informed fund manager makes
E [ ( −  )] = 
p22
2
 (33)
while the uninformed has zero expected profit. Finally, in the case of two uninformed managers,
both have zero expected profits.
Notice that
E [ ( −  )]  E [( − ) ( −  )]  (34)
if and only if
√
(1−)3
3−
√
2  1∀. Furthermore,


⎛
⎝
q
(1− )3
3− 
√
2
⎞
⎠  0 (35)
and ⎛
⎝
q
(1− )3
3− 
√
2
⎞
⎠
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
=0
=
√
2
3
 1 (36)
Therefore, the required inequality holds for all , as expected, since managers’ profits are decreasing
in . The following proposition summarizes the insight from this reasoning.
Proposition 5 In the information acquisition stage, there are three possible equilibrium outcomes,
depending on the realization of :
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() If   
√22
2 , the market cannot support any informed traders, and the managers are both
better oﬀ not acquiring information and staying out;
() If 
√22
2    
√
(1−)3
3−
q
22
2 , then the market can support one informed agent, but
not two;
() Finally, if 
√
(1−)3
3−
q
22
2  , the market supports two informed agents.
Now, the measure of the expected informational content of prices is inversely related to

⎛
⎝
q
(1− )3
3− 
r22
2
⎞
⎠
µ 22
422 + 2
− 
2
2
¶
− 
Ã

p22
2
!
2
2
+ 2 (37)
or,

⎛
⎝
q
(1− )3
3− 
r22
2
⎞
⎠
Ã 22
2 − 224
422 + 2
!
− 
Ã

p22
2
!
2
2
+ 2 (38)
And, again the derivativeÃ 22
2 − 224
422 + 2
!


⎛
⎝
q
(1− )3
3− 
r22
2
⎞
⎠+ 
⎛
⎝
q
(1− )3
3− 
r22
2
⎞
⎠ 
Ã 22
2 − 224
422 + 2
!

(39)
cannot be signed, since the first term is positive (product of two negative terms), and the second
is negative (product of terms with opposing signs).
We can also analyze the expected price response to trades, i.e., E ():

⎛
⎝
q
(1− )3
3− 
r22
2
⎞
⎠
22
q 2
2(1−)2
2 2(1−) + 2
+
⎡
⎣
Ã

p22
2
!
− 
⎛
⎝
q
(1− )3
3− 
r22
2
⎞
⎠
⎤
⎦ 2
22 
(40)
or

⎛
⎝
q
(1− )3
3− 
r22
2
⎞
⎠
⎡
⎣
22
q 2
2(1−)2
(3−)2
(1−)
− 
2
22
⎤
⎦+ 
Ã

p22
2
!
2
22  (41)
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and calculating derivatives
⎡
⎣
42
q 2
2(1−)2 −
(3−)2
(1−)
2 (3−)2(1−)
⎤
⎦

Ã

√
(1−)3

22
2
3−
!

+ 
⎛
⎝
q
(1− )3
q
22
2
3− 
⎞
⎠

⎡
⎣4
2

2
2(1−)2
− (3−)2
(1−)
2 (3−)2(1−)
⎤
⎦
  (42)
But, now we cannot sign this expression, as we do not know the sign of
⎡
⎣4
2

2
2(1−)2
− (3−)2
(1−)
2 (3−)2(1−)
⎤
⎦. So
when we add discretionary information acquisition as described here, we cannot determine what
happens to the expected liquidity of the market as relative performance objectives become more
important. The term in square brackets is the diﬀerence between price responses in a market with
two traders and price responses in a market with one trader, i.e., 2 () − 1. This
expression depends on the parameter values and, often, it changes sign as  varies.
Unfortunately, the inconclusiveness of both results remains even if we assume that costs are
uniformly distributed, as before. The only thing that can undoubtedly be stated is that information
acquisition is ex-ante hindered by the presence of relative performance objectives. If we increase
, then some values of  that support equilibria with two informed agents may no longer do so.
Increase in  leads to an increase in the length of the cost interval where only one informed agent can
be supported in equilibrium, and a decrease in the length of the cost interval where two informed
agents can co-exist.
To shed some more light in the discussion, we resort to numerical analysis, under the assumption
that costs are uniformly distributed on the unit interval. We concentrate on the typical behavior
of the market microstructure elements that obtain indeterminate derivative signs in the analytical
solutions.
First, we look at the informational content of prices. Figure 1 presents the typical relationship
between the expected conditional variance of prices and the measure of relative performance, .
As with the case of public information, we obtain that this variance is an increasing function of
, hence, as before, prices become less informative as relative performance objectives increase in
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importance. After a large number of simulations, the conclusion emerges to be that this result is
pervasive and does not seem to depend on the parameter values. So, costly information, private or
public, is enough to reverse the positive eﬀects of relative performance on price informativeness.
Second, we take a closer look at the expected price responses to trades analyzing E (), a
measure inversely related to depth. Note that the behavior of this function depends on the diﬀerence
2 () − 1. If this diﬀerence is positive, less information acquisition is always good:
moving from two to one trader, or one to zero, increases depth. This is a situation similar to the
one under public information. Now, if this diﬀerence is negative, then less information acquisition
may be bad: moving from two to one trader decreases depth but moving from one to zero traders
still increases depth. Notice that as  → 1, 2 ()→ 0 so that for high enough  the diﬀerence
is negative. Furthermore, whenever 2
√
2  3−√
(1−)
q22 , the diﬀerence is also negative. So, apart
from , the ratio
q22 plays an important role in determining the sign of this expression. In
summary, the behavior of the expected price responses to trades as a function of  can take three
possible shapes. We visually depict these three possible situations below. In Figure 2, we have
an always decreasing price response to trades, indicating an increase in depth. Figure 3 shows a
case where the price response is decreasing at the beginning and reverses as  grows, implying that
less information acquisition becomes bad because 2 () − 1  0. Finally, Figure 4
depicts a case where the price response is always increasing, reflecting the fact that the eﬀect of
less information acquisition is dominating and negative.
The shape depicted in Figure 2 is obtained whenever we have a low value for
q22 , so that
2 () − 1  0 and less information helps the depth of the market. Toward the end,
the relationship flattens since  → 1. The shape shown in Figure 3 is obtained for higher values
of the ratio 
22 . The reversal sets in because, as  increases, less information acquisition hurts the
depth of the market (going from two to one trader is bad), and this eﬀect dominates when  is high
enough. The shape illustrated in Figure 4 is obtained when we start with a very high value of 
22
so that moving from two to one trader is always bad, i.e., it decreases depth.
The numerical results for the price informativeness confirm the analytical results obtained with
public information. Relative performance decreases price informativeness when information is
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costly. However, the results for the depth of the market can be quite diﬀerent depending on
parameter values. The main insight here is that information acquisition can help increase market
depth, even though it increases information asymmetry, and there exists parameter values for which
information acquisition would only decrease market depth.
In summary, our theoretical results predict that relative performance always increases market
depth except under private costly information and some additional restriction on the parameters.
However, we can only say in confidence that relative performance increases price informativeness
under free information. Under costly information, this result may be easily reversed and it is always
reversed under private costly information.
V Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the potential eﬀects of the adoption of relative performance pay for fund
managers. We show that, if fund managers are rewarded based on a relative performance measure,
there can be deleterious eﬀects for investors translating into a lower expected utility. However,
markets will typically be more informative and deeper, if information is free.
When we endogeneize the acquisition of information, we see that incentives to acquire infor-
mation may be hindered by relative performance contracts. This last eﬀect may, ex-ante, reduce
the informativeness and depth of the market. So, even though conditional on information being
acquired markets function "better", less information acquisition acts in a countervailing way. In
other words, the result that prices are more informative holds only for the case of free information,
it is reversed when information is costly. The result that markets are deeper (more liquid) also
holds for the case of free information and for public costly information and may or may not hold
in the case of private costly information.
These findings as a whole point to the need for a more nuanced understanding of the contracts
that aim to solve the agency problem between managers and investors. Especially from a regulator’s
perspective, there can be a trade-oﬀ between the benefits of aligning the principal’s interests with
those of the agent and the potential costs associated with the eﬀects on contagion, volatility, and the
informativeness of markets. How this trade-oﬀ can be dealt with is a direction for future research.
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
We start by conjecturing linear price and demand functions, i.e.,
 =  (1 + 2 + )   = e
Notice that symmetry will not be imposed until later on. By our distributional assumptions, we
can write
| ∼ 
µ 2
2 + 2  
2 − 
4
2 + 2
¶
We can now calculate a few conditional moments that will later be of importance:
E [ |] = E [|] = 
2
2 + 2  := ;
E [ |] =  
2
2 + 2 ;
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E [|] = E
£2 + |¤ = E £2|¤
= 
∙
2 − 
4
2 + 2 +
2
¸
:= 
E
£2 |¤ = 2E £¡2 + 2 + 2¢ |¤ = 2 ¡ + 2¢ ;
Therefore, we can calculate the objective function of manager  to be equal to17
E {[( − ) ( −  ( +  + ))] |} = −2−−++2
¡ + 2¢ 
Taking the first derivative with respect to  and setting it equal to zero we have:
 − 2 −  +  = 0
or
 = 
2
£
1−  (1− )
¤
=
£
1−  (1− )
¤
2
2
2 + 2 
So,
 =
£
1−  (1− )
¤
2
2
2 + 2 
Now we impose symmetry,  =  = , getting
2 = [1−  (1− )] 
2
2 + 2
⇔

∙
2 + (1− ) 
2
2 + 2
¸
=
2
2 + 2 
or
 = 
2
2 (2 + 2) + (1− )2 (43)
Now we solve for  as function of . For this we need to derive the price function, i.e.,
 = E [| ( + ) + ] = 2
2
42
³
2 + 22
´
+ 2
[ ( + ) + ] 
hence,
 = 2
2
42
³
2 + 22
´
+ 2
 (44)
17We ignore  here.
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Solving these two equations reveals:
 =
s
2
2 (1− )2 + 22   =
22
q 2
2(1−)2+22
(22 + 2) 2(1−)2+2 + 2

B Proof of Corollary 1
We can easily calculate the expected payoﬀ to investors of fund  by using the derived equilibrium
in Proposition 1:
E [ ()] = E [ ( −  )] = E [e ( −  (e +  e + ))]
= 2 − 222 − 22 = 
£2 −  ¡22 + 2¢¤
= 2
s
2
2 (1− )2 + 22
µ
1− 2
2 + 2
2 (2 + 2) + (1− )2
¶
= 2
s
2
2 (1− )2 + 22
µ 2 + (1− )2
2 (2 + 2) + (1− )2
¶
= 2
r2
2
Ã p2 + (1− )2
2 (2 + 2) + (1− )2
!

C Proof of Corollary 2
To prove the statement on the corollary we just need to show that E [ ()]  0. But
E [ ()] = 2
r2
2
Ã p2 + (1− )2
2 (2 + 2) + (1− )2
!

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and, hence,

E [ ()] = 
"
2
r2
2
#


Ã p2 + (1− )2
2 (2 + 2) + (1− )2
!
= 
∙
2
q
2
2
¸½
−122 [2
2+(3−)2]√2+(1−)2 + 
2
p2 + (1− )2¾
[2 (2 + 2) + (1− )2]2
= 
∙
2
q
2
2
¸p2 + (1− )2 ¡2¢
[2 (2 + 2) + (1− )2]2
(
−1
2
£
22 + (3− )2
¤
(2 + (1− )2) + 1
)
= 
2
∙
2
q
2
2
¸p2 + (1− )2
[2 (2 + 2) + (1− )2]2
(
2
¡2 + (1− )2¢− £22 + (3− )2¤
2 (2 + (1− )2)
)
= 
2
∙
2
q
2
2
¸p2 + (1− )2
[2 (2 + 2) + (1− )2]2
½ − (1 + )2
2 (2 + (1− )2)
¾
=  
2
2 (2 + 2) + (1− )2
½ − (1 + )2
2 (2 + (1− )2)
¾
E [ ()]
 0
So, the higher the parameter that determines the manager’s payoﬀ dependence on relative
performance , the lower the ex-ante expected profits of fund investors. Investors would rather have
a fund manager that cares only about absolute performance.
D Proof of Corollary 3
() and (): Recall that
 =
s
2
2 (1− )2 + 22   =
22
q 2
2(1−)2+22
(22 + 2) 2(1−)2+2 + 2

Notice that

  =


s
2
2 (1− )2 + 22  0
So,  increases with the relative performance pay parameter. This means that the higher the
importance of the relative pay, the more aggressively will fund managers trade in their signals as
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claimed in (). And, after some algebra, we can re-write  as
 = 1
2
2 (2 + 2) + (1− )2 
hence,

 = −
1
2


2
2 (2 + 2) + (1− )2 +


µ 2
2 (2 + 2) + (1− )2
¶
1
 
Plugging in the appropriate derivatives and after some algebra we can re-write the above expression
as

 =
4
2 [2 (2 + 2) + (1− )2]
∙
(1− )2 − 22
2 (2 + 2) + (1− )2
¸
 0
Therefore, 
1
  0, and depth is increasing in .
() : Now let’s turn to the price informativeness, for this we need
  [| ] = 2 −
¡
22
¢2
2 £422 + 222 + 2¤ = 2
222 + 22
422 + 222 + 2

then,

  [| ] =
µ 
  [| ]
¶µ 

¶

However,

  [| ] =
∙
1
422 + 222 + 2
¸2 ¡−8222¢  0
and   0. Therefore,

  [| ] =
µ 
  [| ]
¶µ 

¶
 0
Since the variance of the asset payoﬀ conditional on price decreases as  increases, one can
say that higher relative performance leads to increased price informativeness. The first eﬀect
is similar to the eﬀect in Kyle (1985) where an increase in aggressiveness leads to more
revealing prices. The second eﬀect is unique to the present setting. It comes about due to the
presence of the relative performance objective function. So, the mechanism through which
price informativeness is increased is simple, increased relative performance objectives leads
to increased trading aggressiveness, which, in turn, much like in Kyle (1985), leads to more
information being revealed through prices.
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() : Concerning adverse selection costs, we know that this is a zero sum market, the losses of
noise traders is the (aggregate) gain obtained through informed trading (total profits of both
funds).18 Therefore, the adverse selection cost faced by liquidity traders is just
 () = 2E [ ()] = 2
2
r2
2
Ã p2 + (1− )2
2 (2 + 2) + (1− )2
!

and, since we already showed that E [ ()]  0, we can guarantee that  ()  0. This
indicates that liquidity traders are better oﬀ with more relative performance pay for fund
managers. This is another expected result given that we have shown that markets get deeper
as  increases, and we know that deeper markets favor liquidity-strained investors.
E Proof of Proposition 2
The structure of the equilibrium follows immediately from the Proof of Proposition 1, and the
calculation for the coeﬃcient of correlation between the two prices is trivial. Therefore, we are left
with the burden of proof that the correlation coeﬃcient is indeed increasing in either .
Notice that  depends on 1 only through 1’s dependence on it. Hence, if we let  denote a
constant that is independent of 1, we can write
 =  1q¡
42121 + 22121 + 21
¢ 
then

1 = 

Ã
1
(42121+22121+21)
!
1 = 

1
Ã
1
(42121+22121+21)
!2
2 1
(42121+22121+21)
=

q¡
42121 + 22121 + 21
¢
21

³ 21
42121+22121+21
´
1
=

q¡
42121 + 22121 + 21
¢
21
212¡2 + 42121 + 2212¢2  0
Finally, using the fact that 11  0, we have 1 = 1
11  0. Identical calculations show the
same result for 2.
18This result is independent of how the profits are distributed among owners, investors and managers of each fund.
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F Proof of Proposition 3
To find manager ’s profit in the case where both managers decide to be informed, we simply
compute the following expected value:
E [( − ) ( −  )] = E [( (e −  e)) ( −  ( (e + e) + ))]
=  £ (1− )2 − 2E (e −  e) (e + e)¤
=  £ (1− )2 − 2E £e2 + (1− ) e e −  e2¤¤
=  £ (1− )2 − 2 (1− ) ¡2 + 2¢− 2 (1− )2¤
=  (1− ) £2 − 2 ¡22 + 2¢¤
=  (1− )
"
2 − 
2
¡
22 + 2
¢
2 (2 + 2) + (1− )2
#
=  (1− )2
∙ 2 + (1− )2
2 (2 + 2) + (1− )2
¸

Then, we can compute its derivative with respect to :

E [( − ) ( −  )] = 
2




½
(1− )
∙ 2 + (1− )2
2 (2 + 2) + (1− )2
¸¾
= 2 
"
−2 − (1− )2
2 (2 + 2) + (1− )2 +
(1− )©−2 £2 ¡2 + 2¢+ (1− )2¤+ 2 £2 + (1− )2¤ª
[2 (2 + 2) + (1− )2]2
#
= 2 
(
− 
2 + (1− )2
2 (2 + 2) + (1− )2 − (1− )
2
¡
22 + 2
¢
[2 (2 + 2) + (1− )2]2
)
 0
since the term inside curly brackets is negative and   0.
More importantly, given that each manager has to pay  to be informed, an equilibrium
with both informed requires that E [( − ) ( −  )]  . So, if there exists a  such that
E [( − ) ( −  )] = , then for any    the inequality is violated, and no information is
acquired. Conditional on the information being acquired, prices are more informative, but it may
be the case that no information is acquired at all, rendering the last point moot.
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G Proof of Proposition 4
Under the assumptions spelled out in the proposition, each manager has an expected profit of
E [( − ) ( −  )] =
µ
1− 
3− 
¶
 (1− )2
=
µ
1− 
3− 
¶
 (1− )
s
2
2 (1− )2 
2
= 
q
(1− )3
3− 
r22
2
:= 
Hence, we can write (29) as 
h −424
422+2
i
+ 2and plugging in the value of  and  gives:
2
(
1− 2
r22
2
"
(1− ) 32
(3− )2
#)

And, finally, diﬀerentiating this expression with respect to  we get
2

2
r22
2
(1− )05
(3− )3
µ
5
2
+

2
¶
 0
So, expected conditional variance of prices is increasing in , hence prices are less informative as 
increases.
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Figure 1: Price Informativeness and 
Inverse Expected Information Content of Prices
(measured by the expected conditional variance)
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Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: We picture the expected conditional variance of prices, which is inversely related to the informa-
tional content of prices, as a function of relative performance concerns, denoted by . In all simulations,
costs are assumed to be uniformly distributed on the unit interval and  is set to 0.1 (using alternative
values for  does not alter the behavior). The variance of payoﬀs, 2, is set to 0.01, with results again being
robust to other parameter values chosen. Each curve corresponds to a diﬀerent value of the noise variance,
2, within the range indicated in increments of 0.005. The calculated values of the expected conditional
variance of prices are then rescaled to equal 1 when  is 0 and the noise variance is at the minimum of its
set range.
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Figure 2: Low 
22 Case (varying 2 from 0.6 to 0.6315, with 2 = 015 and  = 01)
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Figure 3: Higher 
22 Case (Varying 2 from 0.2 to 0.2315, with 2 = 015 and  = 01)
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Figure 4: Very High 
22 Case (Varying 2 from 0.0005 to 0.032, with 2 = 015,  = 01)
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